It's good to see different groups working together to improve security. This week another browser manufacturer announced future support for an initiative relating to Transport Layer Security (TLS, the successor to SSL).

HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) describes a method for a web site to tell client browsers that they should only interact with it over secure transport, i.e. TLS Whilst there have been browser plugins which support this draft specification, support for HSTS was announced for v4 of Google Chrome in January, and last week for v4 of Mozilla Firefox. Hopefully Microsoft Internet Explorer 9 and ,a href="http://www.opera.com/">Opera will also adopt this.

Why is it important? Some attacks mean that TLS is vulnerable if there are redirects from non-TLS (e.g. http://www.example.com) to TLS (https://www.example.com) content. And if part, or all, of your web site is only meant to be accessed over SSL, HSTS should be implemented now, ready for mainstream adoption.

Further details are provided on the W3C page at Strict Transport Security (STS) and the draft IETF specification is at HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS).

Sometimes when I'm out socially and people ask what I do, the conversation progresses to concerns about their own web site. They may have a hobby site, run a micro-business or be a manager or director of a small and medium-sized enterprise (SME)—there's all sorts of great entrepreneurial activity going on.

It is very common for SMEs not to have much time or budget for information security, and the available information can be poor or inappropriate (ISSA-UK, under the guidance of their Director of Research David Lacey, is trying to improve this). But what can SMEs do about their web presence—and it is very unusual not to have a web site, whatever the size of business.

Last week I was asked "Is using <company> okay for taking online payments?" and then "what else should I be doing?". Remember we are discussing protection of the SME's own web site, not protecting its employees from using other sites. If I had no information about the business or any existing web security issues, this is what I recommend checking and doing before anything else:

• Obtain regular backup copies of all data that changes (e.g. databases, logs, uploaded files) and store these securely somewhere other than the host servers. This may typically be daily, but the frequency should be selected based on how often data changes and how much data the SME might be prepared to lose in the event of total server failure.
  • check backup data can read and restored periodically
  • don't forget to securely delete data from old backups when they are no longer required
• Use a network firewall in front of the web site to limit public (unauthenticated user) access to those ports necessary to access the web site. If other services are required remotely, use the firewall to limit from where (e.g. IP addresses) these can be used.
  • keep a record of the firewall configuration up-to-date
  • limit who can make changes to the firewall
• Ensure the host servers are fully patched (e.g. operating system, services, applications and supporting code), check all providers for software updates regularly and allow time for installing these.
  • remove or disable all unnecessary services and other software
  • delete old, unused and backup files from the host servers
• Identify all accounts (log in credentials) that provide server access (not just normal web page access), such as used for transferring files, accessing administrative interfaces (e.g. CMS admin, database and server management/configuration control panels) and using remote desktop. Change the passwords. Keep a record of who has access and remove accounts that are no longer required and enable logging for all access using these accounts.
  • restrict what each account can do as much as possible
  • add restrictions to the use of these accounts (e.g. limit access by IP address, require written approval for use, keep account disabled by default)
• Check that every agreement with third parties that are required to operate the web site are in the organisation's own name. These may include the registration of domain names, SSL certificates, hosting contracts, monitoring services, data feeds, affiliate marketing agreements and service providers such as for address look-up, credit checks and making online payments.
  • ensure the third parties have the organisation's official contact details, and not those of an employee or of the site's developers
  • make note of any renewal dates
• Obtain a copy of everything required for the web site including scripts, static files, configuration settings, source code, account details and encryption keys. Keep this updated with changes as they are made.
  • verify who legally owns the source code, designs, database, photographs, etc.
  • check what other licences affect the web site (e.g. use of open source and proprietary software libraries, database use limitations).

Do what you can, when you can. Once those are done, then:

• Verify the web site and all its components (e.g. web widgets and other third party code/content) does not include common web application vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers (e.g. SQL injection, cross-site scripting).
  • use resources such as the OWASP Top Ten and WASC Threat Classification
  • build security requirements into future developments
• Check what obligations the organisation is under to protect business and other people's data such as the Data Protection Act, guidance from regulators, trade organisation rules, agreements with customers and other contracts (e.g. PCI DSS via the acquiring bank).
  • impose security standards and obligations on suppliers and partner organisations
  • keep an eye open for changes to business processes that affect data
• Document (even just some short notes) the steps to rebuild the web site somewhere else, and to transfer all the data and business processes to the new site.
  • include configuration details and information about third-party services required
  • think about what else will need to be done if the web site is unavailable (does it matter, if so what exactly is important?)
• Provide information to the web site's users how to help protect themselves and their data.
  • point them to relevant help such as from GetSafeOnline, CardWatch and Think U Know
  • provide easy methods for them to contact the organisation if they think there is a security or privacy problem
• Monitor web site usage behaviour (e.g. click-through rate, session duration, shopping cart abandonment rate, conversion rate), performance (e.g. uptime, response times) and reputation (e.g. malware, phishing, suspicious applications, malicious links) to gather trend data and identify unusual activity.
  • web server logs are a start, but customised logging is better
  • use reputable online tools (some of which are free) to help.

That's just the basics. So, what would be next for an SME? If the web site is a significant sales/engagement channel, the organisation has multiple web sites, is in a more regulated sector or one that is targetted particularly by criminals (e.g. gaming, betting and financial), takes payments or does other electronic commerce, allows users to add their own content or processes data for someone else, the above is just the start. Those SMEs probably need to be more proactive.

This helps to protect the SME's business information, but also helps to protect the web site users and their information. After all, the users are existing and potential customers, clients and citizens.

Oh, the best response I had to someone when I was explaining my work: "You're an anti-hacker than?". Well, I suppose so, but it's not quite how I'd describe it.

Any comments or suggestions?

Continuing on the theme of confusing users, Security Dialogs and Graphics discussed the multitude of inconsistent styles for security warnings on web sites, mobile applications and in email.

This is usability hell. Why should each device, browser and application choose how these messages are worded and displayed? I mentioned previously the contributing factor of tab colouring in IE8 and a recent post Tabnabbing: A New Type of Phishing Attack demonstrates how users can be tricked into providing sensitive information to the wrong web site. But it's not just inconsistent technical implementation that matters; the humans in the process matter too.

Last week I came across two web sites in my normal business usage that gave me invalid SSL/TLS secure certificate warnings, and these weren't little businesses that might not know any better—both are multinational enterprises—one a UK bank, and the other a UK mobile phone company.

1. In one case a registration process used a domain www.[subdomain].[company].co.uk whereas the certificate was for [subdomain].[company].co.uk
2. In the other, the company had recently been taken over and the site was using www.[oldcompanyname].com whereas the certificate was for www.[newcompanyname].co.uk

But what surprised me most was the response I received when reporting these problems to the respective site owners. Neither organisation had a clear process for sending details of possible security problems and therefore the responses seem to have been directed through customer support channels.

One provided the initial response:

and:

and even though I re-explained the problem, and that it hadn't stopped me from doing what I wanted:

and then:

and the rather indefinite:

and then back to asking me to supply screenshots, my username and details of my browser:

Mmm.. and still no idea about the issue:

My issue? Their issue I believe.

The other company suggested it was the date/time on my own computer which was the fault:

and some advice about security:

at which point I rang them up, and stumped them by quoting their own tracking number. No further call back from them yet.

I found this all rather depressing. How can we expect customers (end users) to take care with security if the understanding and processes are not in place within the organisation, especially with customer-facing staff? Organisations like Get Safe Online and Card Watch are trying their best to educate people, but the web site owners need to play along too. So here's a quick checklist, including a couple of new items:

1. Obtain your own domain like example.com or example.co.uk (not a sub-domain of someone other company e.g. example.uk.com)
2. Provide security training to web site architects and developers
3. Determine how SSL/TLS will be applied on the site
4. Buy a certificate and apply SSL usage appropriately through the site
5. Verify the proper usage of SSL and session management
6. Verify the correct SSL configuration
7. Include SSL/TLS certificate management in change control processes
8. Provide awareness training to customer support staff about what "secure web site" means and the types of enquiries customers may have
9. Give some basis security advice to customers and direct them to other resources for more information
10. Ensure there is a simple way for people to inform you of security concerns and possible incidents such as phishing, browser security warnings, compromised credentials, account mis-use, etc.

Please—I don't want to have to go through customer support again! At the time of publishing this post, the certificate problems still exist.

The next Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) London meeting is this week.

The London chapter meeting is on Thursday 14 January 2010 in EC1. Everyone is welcome, but you need to register first (free).

There will be talks on Top Ten Deployment Mistakes That Render SSL Useless by Ivan Ristić and Using Selenium to Hold State for Web Application Penetration Testing by Yiannis Pavlosoglou, who recently joined the OWASP Global Industry Committee.

Unfortunately I am unable to attend the meeting but hope to read the presentations afterwards.

Many organisations like to do land grab with domain names by purchasing the same name with different generic top-level domains (e.g. .com, .net, .info), country code top-level domains (e.g. .uk, .es, .fr), and multiple second-level domains (e.g. .co.uk, .org.uk). Then of course there are mis-spellings, similar sounding words, brand names and trademarks.

Well all that leads to complexity, and it's not uncommon for many domains to be aliased to the same site in a way that any of them can be used to access the complete web site.

But it can get especially messy when SSL is enabled on some or all of the site too. Inevitably there end up being certificate warnings. Some organisations should know better. So when I was searching for providers of online and business privacy "seals",

I was very surprised to click on the link to an SSL page which was reported as using an invalid certificate.

Actually the certificate was fine, it just wasn't valid for the .ORG domain. Perhaps they had hoped the wildcard SSL certificate *.trust.com would somehow cater for *.truste.* - no.

Identity theft? Privacy? But apart from these configuration issues, isn't it just very confusing to have many different domains appearing in search engine results? How does this duplicate content affect their search engine ranking? Does it undermine trust in the brand? Should the SSL part of the site be indexed at all? Perhaps. Who makes these decisions? Is it the developers, the person who configured the site or does the business have a viewpoint?

I overheard a (loud) mobile telephone conversation this week in which a marketing manager* was apologising for a problem but they "did not know any of the technicalities". Mmmm, who is accountable? Make it your business to know.

[* Security and technology managers should also understand their organisation's business objectives.]

Phishing attacks are often targeted at organisations where login credentials can be used to gain financial reward, and these web sites almost always use SSL to allow users to authenticate the identity of the site and to protect data in transit from alteration or copying.

A recent paper Crying Wolf: An Empirical Study of SSL Warning Effectiveness from Carnegie Mellon University discussed the results of a survey of over 400 internet uses. The conclusion - users ignore warnings about invalid SSL certificates.

The subject of trust user experience (TUX) was discussed during the Workshop on Security and Human Behaviour (SHB 2009) at Cambridge University this summer, and summarised here. This included a discussion on how users, who are trained to be sensitive to warnings, become more susceptible to picture-in-picture attacks. These are where an image of a (fake) browser, perhaps with a graphical representation of a green extended validation address bar is displayed inside the user's real browser window, such as in the example mock-up below. This is most effective when the real browser is displayed at the full screen resolution.

Therefore I was interested to read about how web designers can use CSS to access operating system style settings (the "chrome" of Linux, Windows, Mac, etc) and use these to apply matching fonts and colours to web design elements. This means if users have a customised desktop colour scheme, the fake browser in the picture-in-picture attack doesn't need to be in standard desktop colours, but could pick up on the user's own settings, to confuse them further.

See also my comments about Colour Overload with IE8 Tab Grouping.

Do You Have SSL Configured Correctly? Let me start by saying that "correctly" means "best for you". There isn't a single correct answer, although there are certainly some "don'ts" that apply in every situation.

This information is not about whether to use SSL, and is mainly for your systems folk (or hosting company), but do read on and perhaps gain a better understanding.

Ivan Ristić recently announced the SSL Server Rating Guide (draft 10, 21 July 2009) and an associated online assessment tool called the Public SSL Server Database. These had reminded me to post my comments last Tuesday about the slightly related Colour Overload with IE8 Tab Grouping.

The SSL Labs' resources describe, and allow you to check, the SSL configuration of your own, or any other public site that has SSL enabled. The checks span the certificate and three categories of web server configuration settings. Previously, it needed more specialist tools that most people wouldn't have the time or inclination to use.

The rating guide contains much useful information, but will be too detailed for many people. However, do read the "Minimal Configuration Requirements" and pass these on to appropriate person responsible for the configuration and operation of your own web sites. Not every site needs an overall rating of 73 or 85 or whatever. You'll see in Table 6 of the guide, an idea of what might be suitable for a range of web site types.

After all, your competitors, and some customers, have probably already checked your site.

Do people understand tab grouping in Internet Explorer version 8 (IE8)? This was a new idea introduced to collect together and identify tabs originating from the same source.

Note this isn't grouping based on the web site (domain name)—it's grouping from which other tab you clicked. The group colour is selected randomly, so yesterday's blue might be today's yellow.

My concern with tab grouping is not the concept, but the use of colour. Not because of the accessibility difficulty that some people may have distinguishing between colours, which is partially addressed by Microsoft in a tab naming convention, but because the colours can lead to confusion about SSL certificates. Take this example with four tabs open, the first tab selected and a current Extended Validation (EV) SSL certificate in use:

1. Bank No X online banking login (domain A / SSL)
2. Bank No X information page (domain B / non-SSL) opened using a link on page 1
3. Bank No Y home page (domain C / non-SSL)
4. Bank No Y business banking login (domain D / SSL) opened using a link on page 2

What does green mean? How about if we have an invalid SSL certificate and the tab group is green:

Confusing? Yes. It can lead to this type of misunderstanding:

Helping people to identify and reject invalid SSL certificates is important—IE8 users are being put at a disadvantage by Microsoft. I'd like to see tab grouping turned off by default for now, and some other indicator of tab groups used instead of distracting colour-coding. Perhaps, since new tabs are always opened adjacent to their 'parent', even something as simple as this mock-up might suffice:

Is this easier to understand? What do you think?

Since I've been writing about SSL Certificates recently, I thought I'd share a screen capture I took a year or so ago of an expired certificate warning.

This time it wasn't the site I was on, but some embedded code from a third party:

Yes my computer's time was correct. So, even large organisations can get this wrong. Having a schedule of all certificates, domain names, software licences and other agreements for your website helpd keep track of time dependent renewals.

And, I wonder just why did AlertSite feel the need to have code from the Google Advertising on their login page?

I recently discussed organisation names on SSL certificates. The padlock has become an overused visual indicator to indicate use of SSL certificates or broader protection measures.

Padlock icons have never been the exclusive browser indicator of a site using a valid, trusted SSL (more correctly now called Transport Layer Security [TLS], SSL's successor) certificate, and the position in the browser has varied considerably.

Here are a couple of mis-uses of the padlock symbol—neither are related to SSL certificates. They simply add to confusion about what is a secure website.

How do we expect users to understand what "secure server", "security certificate" and "security" mean in the web world? Maybe we should ensure our designers understand first.

Perhaps encourage them to read trusted resources like Learn About Secure Web Pages from Get Safe Online.

Then we can avoid pages like this:

which links to a restricted access area, but not on a secure server!