13 August 2010

PADSS

Posts relating to the category tag "PADSS" are listed below.

13 August 2010

PCI DSS and PA-DSS Standards Changes

PCI DSS and PA-DSS standards changes have been pre-announced by the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SCC).

Photograph of an emergency repair van parked on the pavement outside a TK Maxx store in central London; TK Maxx are famous for a credit card data breach in the US

Yesterday's announcement, which also includes notice of changes to PIN Transaction Security (PTS) requirements, provides a summary of the upcoming changes to v2.0 of PCI DSS and PA-DSS due in October 2010. Apart from increased alignment between the standards, the upcoming changes are meant to provide clarifications, additional guidance, new requirements and provide ways to improve organisations' flexibility to implement controls using a risk-based approach. There is also mention of a more forward-looking approach with guidance on managing evolving threats.

The indication that a risk-based approach is to be recommended for assessing vulnerabilities is a welcome change. This of course needs to be undertaken with a real regard of the risks to the business and its customers, clients and citizens, not just the data itself. The references to additional sources of good coding standards and vulnerabilities is encouraging.

The new standards are expected to be published on 28 October 2010 and will come into force on 1 January 2011. This will be quite a tight deadline for many operators to ensure they continue in compliance. The press release also includes details of upcoming meetings and webinars where additional information will be provided by the PCI SSC.

Posted on: 13 August 2010 at 08:36 hrs

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20 July 2010

Payment Card Data Tokenisation

Visa Inc has released a guide to Card Data Tokenization Best Practices.

partial image of the cover from Visa Inc's 'Card Data Tokenization Best Practices, Version 1.0', July 2010

The intention is to provide guidance on using non-sensitive surrogate values (tokens) as a proxy for card data (typically the primary account number or PAN) by merchants, vendors, service providers and acquirers. This in turn can reduce where card data exists, and therefore the scope for compliance with the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCISSC) Data Security Standard (DSS). The guidance joins other information in Visa'a Cardholder Information Security Program (CISP).

The guidance describes Visa's best practices for the tokenization system, token generation, token mapping, the card data vault (the secure repository that maps tokens to cardholder data), cryptographic key management and the management of historical data.

However the guidance may not generally accepted and is being debated here and here, especially with regards to reversibility of the process and the use of salts when hashing, but Visa are seeking feedback on this first version, and have asked for responses by 31 August 2010 to be sent by email to inforisk@visa.com.

Posted on: 20 July 2010 at 10:57 hrs

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02 July 2010

Web Site Security Basics for SMEs

Sometimes when I'm out socially and people ask what I do, the conversation progresses to concerns about their own web site. They may have a hobby site, run a micro-business or be a manager or director of a small and medium-sized enterprise (SME)—there's all sorts of great entrepreneurial activity going on.

It is very common for SMEs not to have much time or budget for information security, and the available information can be poor or inappropriate (ISSA-UK, under the guidance of their Director of Research David Lacey, is trying to improve this). But what can SMEs do about their web presence—and it is very unusual not to have a web site, whatever the size of business.

Photograph of a waste skip at the side of St John Street in Clerkenwell, London, UK, with the company's website address written boldly across it

Last week I was asked "Is using <company> okay for taking online payments?" and then "what else should I be doing?". Remember we are discussing protection of the SME's own web site, not protecting its employees from using other sites. If I had no information about the business or any existing web security issues, this is what I recommend checking and doing before anything else:

  • Obtain regular backup copies of all data that changes (e.g. databases, logs, uploaded files) and store these securely somewhere other than the host servers. This may typically be daily, but the frequency should be selected based on how often data changes and how much data the SME might be prepared to lose in the event of total server failure.
    • check backup data can read and restored periodically
    • don't forget to securely delete data from old backups when they are no longer required
  • Use a network firewall in front of the web site to limit public (unauthenticated user) access to those ports necessary to access the web site. If other services are required remotely, use the firewall to limit from where (e.g. IP addresses) these can be used.
    • keep a record of the firewall configuration up-to-date
    • limit who can make changes to the firewall
  • Ensure the host servers are fully patched (e.g. operating system, services, applications and supporting code), check all providers for software updates regularly and allow time for installing these.
    • remove or disable all unnecessary services and other software
    • delete old, unused and backup files from the host servers
  • Identify all accounts (log in credentials) that provide server access (not just normal web page access), such as used for transferring files, accessing administrative interfaces (e.g. CMS admin, database and server management/configuration control panels) and using remote desktop. Change the passwords. Keep a record of who has access and remove accounts that are no longer required and enable logging for all access using these accounts.
    • restrict what each account can do as much as possible
    • add restrictions to the use of these accounts (e.g. limit access by IP address, require written approval for use, keep account disabled by default)
  • Check that every agreement with third parties that are required to operate the web site are in the organisation's own name. These may include the registration of domain names, SSL certificates, hosting contracts, monitoring services, data feeds, affiliate marketing agreements and service providers such as for address look-up, credit checks and making online payments.
    • ensure the third parties have the organisation's official contact details, and not those of an employee or of the site's developers
    • make note of any renewal dates
  • Obtain a copy of everything required for the web site including scripts, static files, configuration settings, source code, account details and encryption keys. Keep this updated with changes as they are made.
    • verify who legally owns the source code, designs, database, photographs, etc.
    • check what other licences affect the web site (e.g. use of open source and proprietary software libraries, database use limitations).

Do what you can, when you can. Once those are done, then:

  • Verify the web site and all its components (e.g. web widgets and other third party code/content) does not include common web application vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers (e.g. SQL injection, cross-site scripting).
  • Check what obligations the organisation is under to protect business and other people's data such as the Data Protection Act, guidance from regulators, trade organisation rules, agreements with customers and other contracts (e.g. PCI DSS via the acquiring bank).
    • impose security standards and obligations on suppliers and partner organisations
    • keep an eye open for changes to business processes that affect data
  • Document (even just some short notes) the steps to rebuild the web site somewhere else, and to transfer all the data and business processes to the new site.
    • include configuration details and information about third-party services required
    • think about what else will need to be done if the web site is unavailable (does it matter, if so what exactly is important?)
  • Provide information to the web site's users how to help protect themselves and their data.
    • point them to relevant help such as from GetSafeOnline, CardWatch and Think U Know
    • provide easy methods for them to contact the organisation if they think there is a security or privacy problem
  • Monitor web site usage behaviour (e.g. click-through rate, session duration, shopping cart abandonment rate, conversion rate), performance (e.g. uptime, response times) and reputation (e.g. malware, phishing, suspicious applications, malicious links) to gather trend data and identify unusual activity.
    • web server logs are a start, but customised logging is better
    • use reputable online tools (some of which are free) to help.

That's just the basics. So, what would be next for an SME? If the web site is a significant sales/engagement channel, the organisation has multiple web sites, is in a more regulated sector or one that is targetted particularly by criminals (e.g. gaming, betting and financial), takes payments or does other electronic commerce, allows users to add their own content or processes data for someone else, the above is just the start. Those SMEs probably need to be more proactive.

This helps to protect the SME's business information, but also helps to protect the web site users and their information. After all, the users are existing and potential customers, clients and citizens.

Oh, the best response I had to someone when I was explaining my work: "You're an anti-hacker than?". Well, I suppose so, but it's not quite how I'd describe it.

Any comments or suggestions?

Posted on: 02 July 2010 at 08:18 hrs

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19 November 2008

Get Data Protection Right from the Start

This week one of my friends is staying with me. She attended the launch of a new interior design web site yesterday and asked some pertinent questions during the demonstration.

During the walkthrough of the shopping cart and checkout, real credit card data belonging to the demonstrator's assistant were entered on the projection screen in front of a large audience including journalists. My friend pointed this out, but too late - they had to continue. Demos should always try to use appropriate test data whenever possible - in this case it's likely the site, or a copy in a test environment, could have been set up to use test card data - so-called "magic numbers" - with a test merchant account provided by the payment gateway provider.

The web site can act as a store front for individual designers, such as my friend, and she asked where the customers were opting in for the use of their personal data, and who had access to it - the site operator or the end supplier (designer). This seems a very valid question. Apparently that hadn't been looked at yet.

Even the "best" projects seem to have a lack of data protection forethought. In this case, it clearly wasn't a problem with the budget, but the planning and system design.

Posted on: 19 November 2008 at 08:48 hrs

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